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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
A Rube-Goldberg International Monetary Mechanism - The
Dilemmas of the Dollar, The Economics and Politics of the
United States International Monetary Policy, C. Fred Berg-
sten, New York, New York University Press, A Council on
Foreign Relations Book, 1975. Pp. xv, 584.
In the spring of 1968, when C. Fred Bergsten was working on
the first draft of this book I gave a lecture at North Carolina
State University at Raleigh entitled "Our Rube Goldberg Inter-
national Monetary Mechanism." One young man came up after
the lecture to ask "Who is Rube Goldberg?" Knowledge in this
field has doubtless deteriorated today. For the benefit of those
born after 1950, Rube Goldberg was a cartoonist who imagined
mechanical devices of great complexity to achieve simple tasks,
for example, an alarm clock which when it reached a certain time
would release a mouse from a cage to eat through a piece of cheese
preventing a trigger on a spring from firing a gun. With the
cheese consumed the gun would destroy a string, holding down
a gas balloon, which on rising would ... etc. The metaphor caime
back to me as I read the last chapters of Bergsten's book, the
completion of which was delayed by his service in the government.
It is not the diagnosis of the problem that I object to. The
early chapters of the book are admirable in analysis if somewhat
turgid in their use of social-science jargon and unduly given to
words like "viable," "systemic," "meaningful," "options," "on-
going" and the like. Bergsten describes the gold standard as it
was operated at the peak of British economic preeminence. He
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analyzes effectively the several roles of the dollar as intervention,
vehicle and reserve currency in the post-World War II period
until the late 1960s, and sketches the difficulties in the interval
between the wars when the system was not maintained by anyone.
Moreover, his description of the breakdown of the postwar
dollar standard is difficult to fault. He perhaps argues more that
it was unpleasant for the United States than would Susan
Strange, whose Volume II on International Monetary Relations
written for the British equivalent of the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions appeared also last year in Andrew Shonfield's International
Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971 (London,
Oxford University Press, 1975), and who takes the view that the
United States benefits outweighed costs by a great deal and that
it was the other countries in the system that suffered from it.
United States income declined from 40 percent to 25 percent of
the world total. Countries like Germany (with or without its
EEC partners) and Japan, and belatedly the oil producers,
achieved a position in the world economy enabling them to rival
and in some instances to overtake the United States in reserve
holdings, foreign trade, income per capita, rates of growth, and
found, on that account, a subsidiary role in the world monetary
system unacceptable. The dollar became overvalued - but no
one has said exactly when or how, nor does Bergsten. It was time
for a New Deal, and Bergsten tries to sketch its lineaments.
First he disposes of alternative courses, eliminating the dollar
from the system on the one hand, and moving all the way to a
pure dollar standard - here ambiguously called "crowning the
dollar" - on the other. As every reader of policy memoranda
will realize, Option A at one extreme and Option C at the other
are nonviable, and the task is to find a middle road. This occu-
pies most of the book. Bergsten wants adjustment via exchange
rates - he doesn't much care whether wider bands around fixed
parities, frequently changed parities, or flexible rates - but with
international rules and surveillance. He wants international liqui-
dity provided by the issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs),
again agreed internationally, with some provision, difficult to
work out on paper before actual negotiations, on converting into
SDRs the so-called "dollar overhang," dollars held by foreigners
which are in excess to central-bank and perhaps foreign private
felt needs. Central-bank swap arrangements would be retained
to take care of crises, although this aspect of the system is
mentioned rather than developed at length. He is tolerant of
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central banks that prefer to keep gold among their assets. It is
in trying to wrap up flexible exchange rates, SDRs, dollars, other
national currencies, gold, the overhang, and so on that the in-
genuity of Rube Goldberg comes to mind. Sometimes exchange
rates should change, sometimes not. This fact calls for "presump-
tive indicators" and "international guidelines" against which in-
ternational surveillance holds sway. The SDR takes over the
reserve-currency role of the dollar, but not the intervention or
vehicle-currency roles, and even the reserve-currency role not all
the way, as room is left for dollars and gold. The SDR has to be
improved by eliminating the provisions for reconstituting initial
allocations every five years, and limits of three times initial allo-
cations, but equal complexity is provided by the suggestions for
correcting the dollar overhang, with a special issue of SDRs those
who want to convert dollars, which is kept open against the possi-
bility that dollars later are transferred from a willing to a previ-
ously unwilling holder. To prevent Gresham-law instability
among SDRs, national currencies and gold, central banks have to
announce the proportions in which they choose to keep their
reserves, and stick to them.
But what if this particular mouse does not like cheese, or
Rube forgets to set the alarm clock? It is easy to recognize that
the United States and all other countries are becoming more
mercantilistic, that the United States no longer wants or is ac-
ceptable in the role of running the international monetary system
as a dollar system. But this does not sanction building a system
by starting with proposition A, finding objection to it B, which
is met by qualification C, leading to exceptions D, E, F. This is
to repeat the silliness in trying to square the circle of making
the SDR as good as gold, but no better than the dollar, when
gold was better than the dollar, by provisions for reconstituting,
in case no one would hold them, and limits to excuse any one
country from having to hold too much.
More fundamental than the wasted ingenuity, I suspect,
is the fallacy which runs through the work that because some-
thing is necessary it is possible. Reform is necessary, Bergsten
says frequently (vide pp. 494, 557). Therefore it must be possible.
Compromises must be found. But contemplate a position, say
between Israel and Syria, where one country says it wants to
exist, the other that it must be destroyed. Compromise is not
always possible.
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In the instant case of an international monetary system, we
have a public good. Public goods are typically provided, when
at all, by government. Generally, international government does
not exist. Generally public goods are underproduced because of
the free-rider principle, also embodied in the slogan "Let George
do it," or "Pass the buck." The United States was able and will-
ing to provide the international public good of managing the
dollar as international money. It is no longer willing or able to do
so. But that does not mean that it is or will be easy to get inter-
national agreement on rules to provide the public good. The more
likely outcome is no international money, i.e., flexible exchange
rates which give rise, on occasion, to disputes like the present one
over the yen, with the United States thinking the yen ought to
be revalued, the Japanese taking a different view, and no possible
means of reconciliation. A tug of war is possible but unlikely,
given still vivid memories of competitive exchange depreciation.
We limp along on the international limping standard.
Bergsten of course knows this. While this book was in prepa-
ration and in press, he, more than most economists it is fair to say,
has predicted impasses, trade wars, confrontations with develop-
ing countries, international economic turmoil, sturm und drang.
He writes a lot, and says a lot of things, not all of which turn
out in the passage of time to continue to bear the ring of truth.
But this book in hard cover suffers particularly from a short
half-life. The SDR is on the shelf. Issues of presumptive indica-
tors and overhangs have given way to recycling, debt rescheduling,
the need for stability as seen at Rambouillet and Jamaica, not to
mention the New International Economic Order which would like
to see a little exchange-rate order provided as a backdrop for the
many demands of the developing countries. The dilemmas of the
dollar continue in abundance, but they are not limited to those set
out by Bergsten, nor is their resolution along his lines inevitable
or even likely.
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